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THE COMPUTER MADE ME DO IT: IS 
THERE A FUTURE FOR FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
LIABILITY AGAINST ELECTRONIC HEALTH 
RECORD VENDORS? 
Deborah R. Farringer* 
“The time has come to put the medical clipboard out of business and replace 
it with the computer. In doing so, we can transform our health care system so that 
we achieve fewer medical mistakes, lower costs, better care, and less hassle. We 
all agree transformation must take place; now let’s all agree to work together to 
do it. An entrepreneur I admire said, ‘There are three ways to handle change. 
You can fight it and die; accept it and survive; or, lead it and prosper.’ This is the 
United States of America. I say, let’s lead and prosper.” 
- Mike Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of the movement toward the use of electronic health rec-
ords (EHRs), an axiom in the promotion of EHRs has been the idea that the use 
of EHRs will reduce medical errors.2 Certainly, there are countless examples of 
how technology can improve the health care experience and aid providers in 
reducing medical errors, including errors of medication administration, medica-
tion management, access to decision support tools, telemedicine, immediate ac-
cess to diagnostic tests and other clinical information and treatment results—
just to name a few.3 Even with such improvements, however, EHRs have not 
entirely eliminated medical errors, and new technology has in fact created its 
own challenges and issues that might lead to liability in a different way.4 As the 
use of EHRs proliferates, so too does the reliance of healthcare workers on the 
systems themselves and the inevitable blame game wherein an individual 
claims that whatever errors occurred were the result of “the computer” or the 
“system” that dictated the manner in which the care was provided or the man-
ner in which the services were reimbursed.5 Ultimately, this “blame game” 
leads all to ask the question—whose fault is that? Can one blame the EHR ven-
dor? To the extent that the answer may in fact be, “Yes,” and the EHR vendor 
is at fault, are such claims easy to maintain? Historically, providers and other 
purchasers of EHRs have had little leverage against EHR vendors. One of the 
primary challenges arises out of the contract between the provider-purchaser 
and the EHR vendor.6 Ultimately, the purchase or licensing of an EHR system 
is actually just the purchase or licensing of software and, as such, the contracts 
resemble standard software licensing agreements, replete with disclaimers of 
                                                        
2  See Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy Regulation on Medical 
Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J.L & MED. 361, 376 (2001) (citing a 2001 report 
issued by the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in American that noted, “IT has 
enormous potential to improve the quality of health care. . . . In the area of safety, there is 
growing evidence that automated order entry systems can reduce errors in drug prescribing 
and dosing. . . . There are many opportunities to use IT to make care more patient-
centered. . . .”). 
3  Id.; see also John W. Hill et al., Law, Information Technology, and Medical Errors: To-
ward a National Healthcare Information Network Approach to Improving Patient Care and 
Reducing Malpractice Costs, 2007 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 159, 162 (2007). 
4  See Hill, supra note 3, at 213 (noting that questions remain regarding legal responsibility 
for maintaining up to date EHRs, ensuring information is true and correct, deciding which 
provider should take action if a medical-threat is identified in the record, etc.). 
5  See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Elec-
tronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1537–55 (2009) (highlighting 
risks of EHR systems due to challenges related to operation of systems, reliance on others’ 
diagnosis and treatment decisions, input errors such as cut and paste functions, decision sup-
port challenges, responsiveness, patient access, and product defects). 
6  Id. at 1554. 
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implied and express warranties and “hold-harmless” or indemnification clauses 
that protect the vendor from third party liability.7 Recent litigation—including 
one particular case involving the federal government’s allegations of fraud—
has started to erode the disconnect between the potential responsibility of the 
EHR vendor and the ability to hold the vendor actually liable for its actions re-
lated to its software. 
On May 31, 2017, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) entered 
into a $155 million settlement with eClinicalWorks (eCW), one of the nation’s 
largest electronic health records vendors,8 to resolve a False Claims Act9 (FCA) 
lawsuit in which the DOJ alleged that eCW caused the submission of false 
claims for federal incentive payments made under the Electronic Health Rec-
ords (EHR) Incentive Program.10 This settlement is unique not only because of 
the rarity of settlements or judgments against an entity based on an allegation 
that the falsity was in causing another to submit a false claim—as opposed to 
an action against an entity that has falsely filed its own claim and received 
payment directly11—but also because it is one of the first of its kind against an 
                                                        
7  Id.; see also Deborah R. Farringer, Send Us the Bitcoin or Patients Will Die: Addressing 
the Risks of Ransomware Attacks on Hospitals, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 972 (2017) (cit-
ing Lisa Schencker, EHR Safety Goes to Court, MOD. HEALTHCARE (June 25, 2016), 
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160625/MAGAZINE/306259982 
[https://perma.cc/75TP-NHDE]). 
8  See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., QUICK-STATS: 
CERTIFIED HEALTH IT DEVELOPERS AND EDITIONS REPORTED BY AMBULATORY PRIMARY 
CARE PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL AND SURGICAL SPECIALISTS, PODIATRISTS, OPTOMETRISTS, 
DENTISTS, AND CHIROPRACTORS PARTICIPATING IN THE MEDICARE EHR INCENTIVE PROGRAM, 
HEALTH IT DASHBOARD (July 2017) [hereinafter QUICK STATS], 
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-Participating-
Professionals.php [https://perma.cc/UY94-EC5B]. 
9  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
10  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Electronic Health Records Vendor to Pay $155 Mil-
lion to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (May 31, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release], 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electronic-health-records-vendor-pay-155-million-settle-false-
claims-act-allegations [https://perma.cc/L474-T6JG]. The settlement also resolved allega-
tions that eCW paid kickbacks to certain customers in exchange for such customers promot-
ing eCW products. Id. 
11  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B). Under both clauses of the False Claims Act, it is a viola-
tion for an entity that contracts with or submits claims directly to the government to know-
ingly present a false or fraudulent claim or knowingly make or use a false record or state-
ment. It is also a violation of both clauses if an entity that does not itself directly contract 
with or directly submit claims to the United States government nevertheless causes a false or 
fraudulent claim to be presented or causes another to cause to be made a false record or 
statement material to a false claim. While claims against entities that directly contract with 
or submit claims to the federal government are common, there are far fewer cases that in-
volve application of provisions under these two sections of the False Claims Act that rely on 
causing another entity to submit a false claim or record. See infra notes 25–28. 
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EHR vendor.12 Following this case, many are wondering whether this settle-
ment with eCW stands alone as an example of the government simply snaring 
one “bad actor,”13 or if this settlement is indicative of what might lie ahead for 
EHR vendors under the FCA. Will the FCA be a new tool under which EHR 
vendors are going to be held responsible for the role that their software might 
play in the delivery of care or the billing and collection of services rendered? 
Indeed, many in the information technology industry took note of this settle-
ment and have speculated that this may not be a singular incident.14 Farzad Mo-
stahsari—former National Coordinator for Health IT—stated, “Let me be plain-
spoken. eClinicalWorks is not the only EHR vendor who flouted certifica-
tion/misled customers. Other vendors better clean up.”15 
 Is Mr. Mostahsari correct and this could be a sign of things to come if EHR 
vendors are not careful about their actions? This Article will examine the exist-
ing eCW settlement agreement, along with other case law against EHR ven-
dors, to determine whether this settlement is simply an outlier among FCA cas-
es, meant only to punish particularly egregious behavior, or the beginning of a 
new era of FCA activity akin to other industries, like the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Part I of this Article will provide a brief history of the FCA and the in-
stances in which the DOJ has utilized provisions under the law against entities 
that or individuals who cause another to submit a false claim or make a materi-
al, false record. It will further review the types of cases outside of the FCA con-
text that have been filed against EHR vendors since providers began more 
widespread adoption of EHR systems, especially after the enactment of the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) and the EHR Incentive Program.16 Part II will then study the eCW 
                                                        
12  See Arthur Allen, Feds Levy $155M Fine Against Software Vendor for Faulty Patient 
Records, POLITICO (May 31, 2017, 6:56 PM), www.politico.com/story/2017/05/31/health-
records-faulty-software-239004 [https://perma.cc/F4AX-KE6F]. 
13  More precisely, it could be argued that the government snared several bad actors because 
the settlement was not only a settlement with eCW, but also with three of eCW’s founders: 
the Chief Executive Officer, Girish Navani; Chief Medical Officer, Rajesh Dharampuriya, 
M.D.; and Chief Operating Officer, Mahesh Navani, all of whom were found jointly and 
severally liable. Additionally, a developer settled separately for $50,000 and two project 
managers settled separately for $15,000 each. Press Release, supra note 10. 
14  See Allen, supra note 12; see also Heather Landi, What Are the Potential Ripple Effects of 
the eClinicalWorks Settlement?, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/print/article/what-are-potential-ripple-effects-
eclinicalworks-settlement [https://perma.cc/Q2MH-6JUP]. 
15  See Landi, supra note 14 (quoting Mostashari’s post on his Twitter account in response to 
the eCW settlement). 
16  The HITECH Act was established under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 in Division A, Title XIII. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2009)). 
The EHR Incentive Program was established under this law. Id. at § 3000. For further dis-
cussion on the EHR Incentive Program and its involvement in the spread of the use of EHRs, 
see infra notes 101–16. 
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case in more detail, examining the actions that led to the settlement and deter-
mine whether such actions are an indication of a new era of FCA cases and 
EHR vendor liability. Part II will additionally examine existing case law 
against EHR vendors to determine whether any patterns can be gleaned from 
the cases that will predict the continued use of the FCA as an enforcement tool 
against EHR vendors. In Part III, this Article will argue that, although the eCW 
case is based on unique facts, it is likely that EHR vendors will face other FCA 
cases as the healthcare industry places increasing responsibility and reliance on 
electronic systems. These suits will likely include allegations of fraud arising 
not only out of the EHR Incentive Program but also the submission of claims 
more generally. Unlike in other FCA cases involving entities that do not con-
tract directly with the federal government, however, it is unlikely that the fed-
eral government will be able to realize as much success or generate the same 
type of monetary rewards against EHR vendors as it has against the pharmaceu-
tical industry because of the distinctions between these two disparate sectors of 
the health care industry. Finally, the Article will conclude by providing some 
thoughts on the impact of the eCW settlement agreement, which puts the EHR 
industry on notice regarding the potential for future liability. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of the False Claims Act 
Enacted in 1863 and often referred as “Lincoln’s Law,” the FCA was orig-
inally designed to incentivize private individuals to assist the federal govern-
ment—then, more accurately, the Union Army17—by filing claims on behalf of 
the government against entities or individuals who are suspected of defrauding 
the government.18 While application of the statute has waned and surged over 
the years based on various changes and amendments, the FCA has become one 
of the federal government’s most effective enforcement tools against fraud.19 
One of primary reasons that use and application of the FCA tends to swell is 
due to adjustments to the percentage of amounts given to so-called qui tam re-
                                                        
17  James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues, 
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264–66 (2013). 
18  See United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998). 
19  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Celebrates 25th Anniversary 
of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986 (Jan. 31, 2012), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-celebrates-25th-anniversary-false-claims-act-amendments-1986 
[https://perma.cc/AJZ3-9D6F] (“The False Claims Act has been called the single most im-
portant tool that American taxpayers have to recover funds when false claims are made to 
the federal government, including health care fraud, mortgage fraud, and procurement fraud. 
‘In the last quarter century, the False Claim Act’s success has been unparalleled with more 
than $30 billion dollars recovered since it was amended in 1986 and $8.8 billion since Janu-
ary 2009,’ said Attorney General Eric Holder.”). 
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lators or whistleblowers.20 The recent increased application of the FCA began 
with amendments enacted in 1986 and its use against health care companies 
was further bolstered as a result of certain DOJ pleading strategies that enabled 
the qui tam relator to allege not only violations of the FCA,21 but also violations 
of the federal Anti-kickback Statute (“AKS”)22 and federal Physician Self-
Referral Law (known as the “Stark Law”).23 What this means for purposes of 
recovery is that if the government or qui tam relator is successful with the 
claim, the government and relator will be able to recover all of the following as 
damages: (a) all amounts paid in error by the government pursuant to each false 
claim submitted; (b) the imposition of fines ranging between $10,781.41–
$21,562.80 per claim submitted; (c) treble damages based on the total amount 
of improperly paid claims; (d) and any additional penalties that would be as-
sessed for violations of the underlying AKS or Stark Law claim in the amount 
of $21,916 per claim and at least $24,253 per claim, respectively.24 Given that 
                                                        
20  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) permits private individuals, known as qui tam relators, to bring a civ-
il action for a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 on behalf of such individuals and the United 
States Government. The individual who files the claim, subject to certain restrictions and 
limitations, receives a portion of the proceeds of any judgment or settlement. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d) (2012). The amount of the award is dependent on whether the government inter-
venes in the case. If the government intervenes, the qui tam relator receives between fifteen 
and twenty-five percent, and if the government does not intervene, then the relator receives 
between twenty-five and thirty-five percent. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
21  Beginning in the 1990s, the DOJ and other whistleblowers began alleging violations of 
the FCA based on violations of the AKS and the Stark Law. See United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1037–38 (S.D. Tex. 
1998); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1509 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1996) (noting that a number of cases have recently begun to allege that violations of 
the AKS or the Stark Law constitute violations of the FCA). With amendments to the AKS 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), a violation of the AKS is 
now—statutorily—a violation of the FCA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012). Because the 
Stark Law is a strict liability statute and does not contain the same scienter requirements of 
the AKS and the FCA, it is still possible to maintain an FCA claim based on allegations of 
the Stark Law, but it is necessary to prove that such violation was knowing and willful, in 
order to satisfy the scienter requirements, set forth under the FCA. See United States ex rel. 
Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2184, 2010 WL 1390661, at *7–9 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 31, 2010). 
22  The federal Antikickback Statute imposes penalties against “knowingly and willfully [of-
fering or paying] any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or in-
directly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind . . . [in return for referring] an individual to a 
person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program. . . .” 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). 
23  The Stark Law prohibits a physician (or the physician’s immediate family member, as de-
fined in the statute) from making referrals for certain services known as “designated health 
services” to any entity with which the physician has a “financial relationship.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395nn(a)(1) (2012). 
24  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). Penalties under the AKS and the Stark Law also re-
quire that any amounts paid in error are reimbursed and then each law imposes civil mone-
tary penalties for violations of each statute. See 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13) (2000); Civil Mone-
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each service rendered to a patient constitutes a claim, it is the magnitude and 
scope of the damages that have made the FCA such a powerful tool.25 Many 
entities have learned first-hand how devastating this ability to assess multiple 
damages can be and thus the potential ramifications of facing such large fines 
and penalties have resulted in entities engaging in settlement on a widespread 
basis when faced with potential FCA claims.26 
Although the bulk of FCA claims are made against providers and other en-
tities who directly submit claims to federal healthcare programs,27 there has 
been an increasing use of the FCA against entities that do not themselves sub-
mit claims directly to the government, but rather cause others to submit claims, 
such as pharmaceutical companies and device manufacturers.28 This theory of 
liability is typically referred to as the “inducement-of-fraud” theory29 because it 
attaches liability to the entity that knowingly causes another entity or individual 
to submit a false or fraudulent claim.30 The ability to impose substantial penal-
ties against these particular entities is especially impactful because the FCA has 
the available tools to impose damages large enough to be noticed in a billion-
dollar industry.31 In fact, to date, the largest settlement in the history of the 
FCA is a settlement with pharmaceutical manufacturer GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK) regarding allegations that GSK unlawfully promoted certain prescription 
drugs, failed to report certain safety data, and engaged in false price reporting 
                                                                                                                                 
tary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,491 (Jun. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. pts. 20, 22, 36, 68, 71, 76, 85). 
25  Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government 
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 124 (2001). 
26  Perhaps the most public cautionary tale involved Tuomey Healthcare System in South 
Carolina that was involved in an FCA suit alleging submissions of false claims as a result of 
Stark Law violations. The Stark Law violations against Tuomey involved 21,730 false 
claims and thus the damages were a total of $237,454,195 ($39,313,065 in actual damages, 
$119,515,000 in civil monetary penalties, and $78,626,130 in punitive damages). See United 
States ex rel. Drakeford, M.D. v. Tuomey Healthcare Sys., Inc., 792 F.3d 364, 370, 389 (4th 
Cir. 2015). The entity was unable to pay such a large judgment and eventually settled with 
the government for just over $72 million dollars. See Lisa Schencker, Tuomey Will Pay U.S. 
$72.4 Million to Duck $237 Million False Claims Verdict, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 16, 
2015), www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20151016/NEWS/151019923 
[https://perma.cc/U97P-T6KZ]. 
27  David Kwok, Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the False 
Claims Act, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 185, 215 (2017). 
28  Id. 
29  See id.; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D. 
Mass. 2001). This is also sometimes referred to as “fraud in the inducement” theory. See 
Andrew E. Shipley, Trends in False Claims Act Litigation, in GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
COMPLIANCE, 49, 49 (2013). 
30  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), (G) (2012). 
31  See Kwok, supra note 27, at 215. 
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practices.32 The company agreed to pay $3 billion in total, consisting of about 
$1 billion for criminal fines and forfeiture and $2 billion for civil liability under 
the FCA.33 
While this is the largest settlement in history of the FCA and the sheer dol-
lar amount seems potentially catastrophic, the allegations involved off-label 
promotion and AKS claims for multiple pharmaceutical products, including 
Avandia, Paxil, Wellbutrin, Advair, Zofran, Imitrex, Lotronex, Flovent, and 
Valtrex, for which the reported sales of such products was far more than the $3 
billion settlement.34 For example, GSK generated profits of $10.4 billion in 
sales from Avandia, $11.6 billion in sales of Paxil, and $5.9 billion in sales of 
Wellbutrin, in addition to profits from the remaining pharmaceuticals men-
tioned in the settlement.35 Thus, although $3 billion is certainly a large settle-
ment, it seems somewhat less impactful when compared to the profits generated 
through the sale of the products and is one of the reasons that many critics be-
lieve that even large settlements such as this one do little to actually deter be-
havior.36 
GSK is not the only pharmaceutical company to have entered into a high 
dollar settlement regarding FCA claims.37 Since 2009, the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) has reported recovery of $19.3 
billion in FCA settlements and judgments relating to health care fraud.38 In a 
published report, the largest six settlements were with pharmaceutical compa-
nies, including the previously noted GSK settlement and major settlements with 
Pfizer, Inc. ($2.3 billion), Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiaries Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals and Scios ($2.2 billion), Abbott Laboratories ($1.5 billion), 
Merck Sharp & Dohme ($963 million), and a settlement with eight pharmaceu-
                                                        
32  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion 
to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allega 
tions-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc/DLF2-T32N]. It should be noted that the $3 billion 
settlement involved FCA claims along with FDA claims under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act. 
33  Id. The civil liability amounts included payments to both federal and state governments. 
34  Id.; Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Set-
tlement, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business/Glaxosm 
ithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/SQ8H-3PSE]. 
35  See Thomas & Schmidt, supra note 34. 
36  Id. (quoting Patrick Burns, spokesperson for the whistle-blower advocacy group Taxpay-
ers Against Fraud); see also Kwok, supra note 27, at 217–18 (“[I]f there is concern that 
sanctions are too great or improperly calculated, it is important to note that the prevalence of 
off-label promotion cases suggests that manufacturers are not deterred by FCA sanctions.”). 
37  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SIGNIFICANT FALSE CLAIMS ACT SETTLEMENTS & JUDGMENTS, FISCAL 
YEARS 2009–2016 (2016) [hereinafter SETTLEMENTS & JUDGMENTS], https://www.justice.gov 
/opa/press-release/file/918366/download [https://perma.cc/VPQ6-XYBP]. 
38  Id. 
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tical manufacturers ($900 million).39 Device manufacturers have also faced 
high dollar settlements under the inducement-of-fraud theory in a similar man-
ner to pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as the settlement with Olympus 
Corporation of the Americas, the leading endoscope distributor, for $646 mil-
lion, and Quest Diagnostics Inc., a manufacturer of diagnostic test kits, for 
$302 million.40 
Despite the large settlements that have been achieved against pharmaceuti-
cal companies and device manufacturers, the reported cases that premise the 
inducement-of-fraud theory of the FCA remain relatively rare.41 While this 
provision of the FCA is not as frequently applied as allegations related to direct 
submissions, courts have affirmed the viability of these types of claims over the 
years.42 Most recently reported inducement-of-fraud cases arise primarily out of 
Massachusetts and the First Circuit.43 Some of this prevalence in the First Cir-
cuit may be due to the court’s finding in the case of United States ex rel. Hut-
cheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., which was particularly favorable to relators 
and prosecution in its application of the knowledge requirement under the 
FCA.44 In Blackstone Medical, the qui tam relator45 alleged that Blackstone 
Medical, Inc. (“Blackstone”), a manufacturer of devices used in spinal surger-
                                                        
39  Id. The settlement with eight pharmaceutical manufacturers involved allegations that the 
manufacturers knowingly reported inflated drug prices that cause providers to submit inflat-
ed claims. It involved Abbott Laboratories, B. Braun Medical Inc., Roxane Laboratories, Par 
Pharmaceutical Inc., Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., Sandoz, Inc., and Mylan Inc. Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Joan H. Krause, Truth, Falsity, and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of 
the Civil False Claims Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 401, 425–26 (2016) (describing the chal-
lenge of the bringing these types of claims and the frequency of settlements). 
42  United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544 (1943) (holding that “causing to 
be presented” provisions under the FCA “indicate a purpose to reach any person who know-
ingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud. . . .”). 
43  While cases in jurisdictions other than the First Circuit have involved FCA allegations 
premised on one party causing another to submit a false claim, the large majority have arisen 
out of the First Circuit. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 
3d 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2016); United States ex rel. Kroening v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
155 F. Supp. 3d 882 (E.D. Wis. 2016); United States ex rel. Nevyas v. Allergan, Inc., No. 
09-432, 2015 WL 4064629 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2015); United States ex rel. Solis v. Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-03010-MCE-EFB, 2015 WL 1469166 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
30, 2015); United States ex rel. Tran v. Computer Sciences Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 104 
(D.D.C. 2014); United States ex rel. Webb v. Miller Family Enterprise, No. 1:13-cv-00169-
DBH, 2014 WL 6611012 (D. Me. July 2, 2014); United States ex rel. Ruscher v. Omnicare, 
Inc., No. 4:08-cv-3369, 2014 WL 2618158 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2014); United States v. Vil-
laspring Health Care Center, Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011 WL 6337455 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 
2011). 
44  See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 389 (1st 
Cir. 2011). 
45  The Department of Justice declined to intervene in the case, however, it did support the 
relator as an amicus in the district court and on appeal. Id. at 378–79. 
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ies,46 paid kickbacks to physicians in the form of consulting agreements, devel-
opment projects, research grants, and royalties (all of which were sham ar-
rangements), and in the form of exorbitant entertainment expenses, high-end 
travel arrangements, and speaking engagements, all to induce the physicians to 
utilize Blackstone products during surgery.47 While the key issue in the case 
was whether the qui tam relator was able to show that the alleged false claims, 
which were based on an implied false certification theory,48 were material,49 the 
court also explored the question of whose knowledge of the falsity was required 
to prove an FCA claim in this instance.50 Blackstone argued that it had not vio-
lated the FCA because the hospital submitting the claim had no knowledge that 
the claims were false at the time of submission.51 The court rejected this posi-
tion, however, finding that the mere fact that the FCA includes “caused to be 
presented” as part of what may constitute a false claim implies that the 
knowledge requirement under the statute is applied to the party that “causes” 
the submission and not the party actually submitting the claim.52 Thus, under 
First Circuit precedent, if an FCA action is brought against a party based on 
that party causing another to submit a false claim, it is sufficient that the entity 
causing the claim to be submitted do so “knowingly.”53 
                                                        
46  Id. at 378. 
47  Id. at 380–81. 
48  Many FCA cases are filed based on the theory of false certification; that is, the theory that 
the falsity of the claim rests not in false factual information that has been misrepresented in 
the claim (e.g., submission of a claim for a service that was never rendered), but instead in 
falsity as it relates to legal compliance (e.g., submission of a claim for a service that had cer-
tain legal preconditions and such legal preconditions were not met). See Joan H. Krause, Re-
flections on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that “Counts” Under the 
False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1817–18 (2017). At the time of this case, 
courts were divided on whether one could sustain an FCA claim based on an allegation that 
submission of the claim implied certification with an underlying law or regulation, otherwise 
known as an implied false certification. See Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d at 387. When 
this case was decided, whether the implied false certification theory of liability was viable 
was a matter of first impression for the First Circuit. Id. The court held that the implied false 
certification theory was a viable theory of liability, but rejected rigid framework that had 
been applied previously in other circuits. Id. at 379–80. 
49  Id. at 394–95. The court found the claims were not material because while the physicians 
were induced to use Blackstone products, they were not induced to submit medically unnec-
essary claims and thus the services themselves (and the claims) were properly rendered, re-
gardless of the medical device that was utilized for the surgery. 
50  Id. at 393. 
51  Id. at 389–90. Blackstone argued that a claim can only be false if it fails to comply with 
an express requirement of a statute and, as such, the hospital needs to be aware that the 
claims were false because an implied false certification claim cannot be sustained based on 
the representation of the non-submitting entity alone. 
52  Id. at 382, 390. 
53  31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012) (defining “knowing” and “knowingly” as “actual 
knowledge of the information,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the infor-
mation” or “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”). 
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Courts in a few other circuits have echoed this position. A District of Co-
lumbia district court described various instances in which these “caused to be 
submitted” provisions have been utilized in the past, setting forth the paradig-
matic case as “when the non-submitting party takes advantage of an unwitting 
intermediary, thereby causing that party to submit a false claim.”54 The Black-
stone Medical case is a good example of this type of situation: the hospital 
submitted claims for drugs or medical devices entirely unaware that the phar-
maceutical company or device manufacturer was paying illegal kickbacks to 
physicians on its medical staff.55 The D.C. court went on to state that these 
types of claims are also actionable (a) if one can prove that the non-submitter 
was the “driving force behind an allegedly fraudulent scheme,”56 (b) when the 
non-submitting party “caused the presentation of false claims where they had 
agreed to take certain critical actions in furtherance of the fraud,”57 or even 
when the “non-submitter continued to do business with an entity upon becom-
ing aware that that entity was submitting false claims.”58 The court thus con-
cluded that liability of a non-submitting party is determined by the “degree to 
which that party was involved in the scheme that results in the actual submis-
sion.”59 
Despite this rather expansive view of liability and the typically exorbitant 
settlement amounts that the government has been able to achieve against phar-
maceutical companies and some device manufacturers, cases premised on the 
inducement-of-fraud theory remain relatively rare.60 It is difficult to glean 
whether similar claims could be as successful in other contexts, in part because 
of the disconnect between the settlement amounts the government has realized 
under the FCA and the profits the companies have generated by the sale of cer-
tain drugs.61 As mentioned above, while settlements between pharmaceutical 
companies and the DOJ are some of the largest settlements in the history of the 
FCA, many companies view any payments required to settle allegations worth 
the benefit realized by incentivizing physicians to prescribe the drugs.62 Given 
the vast distinctions in the profit margin, product offering, and marketing tac-
tics between the EHR industry and the pharmaceutical industry, it is not entire-
                                                        
54  United States ex rel. Tran v. Computer Sciences Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 104, 126 (D.D.C. 
2014). 
55  Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d at 389. 
56  Computer Sciences Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d at 127 (citing United States v. Toyobo Co, Ltd., 
811 F. Supp. 2d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2011)). 
57  Id. (citing United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 
F.3d 702, 715 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
58  Id. (citing United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., 999 F. Supp. 78, 91 
(D.D.C. 1998)). 
59  Id. 
60  See Krause, supra note 41, at 425–26. 
61  See Kwok, supra note 27, at 217. 
62  See id. 
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ly clear whether application of the fraud in the inducement theory will realize 
success against EHR vendors in the same way as in the pharmaceutical context. 
B. EHR Vendor Liability 
Since the enactment of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA)63 and the HITECH Act,64 health care providers have in-
creased their use of and reliance on EHRs dramatically.65 While, for the most 
part, EHRs are seen as a tool that will help the fragmented and disjointed health 
care system become more efficient and enable better continuity of care,66 the 
increased reliance has also led to some unintended consequences.67 Some of the 
challenges reported when using an electronic system include cutting and past-
ing into medical records leading to inaccurate charting,68 inaccurate patient 
tracking or improperly prescribed medications,69 and ransomware attacks mak-
ing access to records impossible, which leads to providers having to turn away 
patients.70 Even as incidents from EHRs affecting patient health and patient 
safety arise, the liability of the EHR vendor up to this point has been relatively 
elusive.71 
                                                        
63  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). HIPAA 
was enacted to assure that individuals could maintain health insurance between jobs and to 
protect the privacy and confidentiality of patient data as the health care industry began more 
widespread use of electronic transmission of patient data. 
64  The HITECH Act was established under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 in Division A, Title XIII. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17, 2009). 
65  See Farringer, supra note 7, at 946. 
66  Why Adopt EHRs?, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/w 
hy-adopt-ehrs [https://perma.cc/D2H7-LTYY] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Why 
Adopt EHRs]. 
67  See Lisa Schencker, EHR Safety Goes to Court, MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 25, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160625/MAGAZINE/306259982 [https://perm 
a.cc/8TWW-Y78B]. 
68  See Eugenia L. Siegler & Ronald Adelman, Copy and Paste: A Remediable Hazard of 
Electronic Health Records, 122 AM. J. MED. 495, 495–96 (2009); see also Arthur Allen, 
Electronic Record Errors Growing Issue in Lawsuits, POLITICO (May 4, 2015, 6:40 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/electronic-record-errors-growing-issue-in-lawsuits-
117591 [https://perma.cc/T8M8-7GDJ] (noting that UCLA professor of medicine, Keith 
Klein, decried the cut-and-paste function of EHRs because, “There are cloned records eve-
rywhere, and if you get sued, you’re going to have a problem in court. . . .”). 
69  See Schencker, supra note 67. 
70  See, e.g., Richard Winton, Hollywood Hospital Pays $17,000 in Bitcoin to Hackers; FBI 
Investigating, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/tech 
nology/la-me-ln-hollywood-hospital-bitcoin-20160217-story.html [https://perma.cc/HY2M-
G5HR]. 
71  See Schencker, supra note 67 (noting that “EHR-related issues contributed to less than 1% 
of all claims closed by [Doctors Co., a malpractice insurer] during [Jan. 2007 to June 
2014]”). 
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There are a multitude of factors that have contributed to the ability of EHR 
vendors to escape from liability relatively unscathed up to this point. First, 
many of the incidents that arise out of EHR usage involve, at least at some lev-
el, human error.72 To the extent that human error in use of an EHR factors into 
the injury or damages caused by its use, it is difficult to assess whether the 
problem is really the EHR itself or, instead, the individual’s use of the EHR.73 
For example, one study identified a number of challenges that affect patient 
care when human error, such as incorrect user input and related dosage errors, 
is made in the EHR, including the fact that “[p]hysicians may fail to enter dis-
continuation orders for particular drugs when they change patients’ medications 
so that the pharmacy continues to provide the old drugs as well as the new 
ones” or “[p]roblematic log-off procedures cause physicians to order medica-
tions on the system before the previous user has fully logged out, resulting in 
the wrong patient receiving the newly-ordered therapy.”74 Certainly, there are 
changes an EHR vendor could make to its product that would, for example, ask 
a follow-up question or require a box to be checked acknowledging the order-
ing of a new drug and the resulting discontinuation of an old drug or require a 
log-in confirmation prior to ordering any new therapy or medication. But, could 
a litigant that is potentially harmed by these errors sustain an action against the 
EHR vendor when much of the blame extends to its users, especially if the 
vendor can claim that the users were thoroughly and extensively trained on the 
dangers of failing to log out of the system or failing to discontinue any medica-
tions prior to ordering any new medications? 
While there have been some successful claims based on allegations that the 
error was caused by an inherent flaw in the structure, design, or operation of the 
EHR system,75 EHR vendors have also avoided liability through contracting 
practices that are commonplace in the lease or purchase of software.76 Like 
most software companies, EHR vendors include onerous contractual language 
                                                        
72  See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 5, at 1544. 
73  See id. at 1544–45 (citing various ways in which human error affects use and liability as-
sociated with EHR systems). 
74  Id. at 1545 (citing Ross Koppel, Role of Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in 
Facilitating Medication Errors, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1197, 1199–1201 (2005)). 
75  See id. at 1552 (noting a 2009 case involving the EHR system of the Veterans Administra-
tion in which the system exposed patients to potentially life-threatening doses of medication, 
had software that provided erroneous calculations of intercranial pressure, and omitted nine-
ty-three minutes of data from an automated anesthesia record of a patient who was quadri-
plegic following brain surgery); see also Schencker, supra note 67 (citing a report by The 
Doctors Co., a physician-owned medical malpractice insurer, stating that of their ninety-
seven medical malpractice claims involving EHRs, about 39 percent were allegations of in-
jury being caused by the EHR: “10% involved a failure of system design . . . 9% involved 
electronic systems or technology failure . . . 7% were due to a lack of EHR alert or alarm for 
support . . . 6% System failure—electronic data routing . . . 4% Insufficient scope/area for 
documentation . . . 3% Fragmented EHR”). 
76  See Allen, supra note 12. 
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in their user agreements, including “hold-harmless” provisions77 and language 
that exempts the vendor “from most legal responsibility under a doctrine 
known as the ‘learned intermediary.’ ”78 The “learned intermediary” doctrine is 
generally thought of as a defense in products liability cases and states: 
[a] prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate 
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding fore-
seeable risks of harm are not provided to: [] prescribing and other health-care 
providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with 
the instruction or warnings.79 
The rationale behind the rule is that the health care provider, and not the 
patient, is generally the one to whom the warnings are directed, and thus the 
provider is the individual in the best position to assess the risks and make med-
ical decisions regarding the product.80 This same concept has been used in con-
nection with EHRs—that vendors provide suggestions and recommendations, 
but that the physician is ultimately responsible for the actual medical care that 
is provided.81 As a result, while there is no question that some EHRs will con-
tain design flaws that medical providers—and, unwittingly, patients—will rely 
on to their detriment and the detriment of their patients, the widespread success 
of such claims has been challenging and relatively limited.82 
Despite the relative rarity of claims against EHR vendors at present, many 
are predicting that the coming years likely will see an increase in claims against 
EHR vendors.83 This increase may be in medical malpractice claims, but it is 
equally likely that many claims will be outside the malpractice context—
between providers and their vendors.84 Unlike patient-plaintiffs who face the 
difficult task of identifying a provider’s EHR vendor and then determining 
whether the plaintiff’s injury was the result of an EHR error or human error, or 
a combination of both, a provider may sue under breach of contract principles 
not just for design flaws that compromise patient safety, but for failure to deliv-
er the promised product.85 Indeed, there have been a growing number of exam-
                                                        
77  See Schencker, supra note 7. 
78  See Allen, supra note 68. 
79  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
80  Id. cmt. b. 
81  See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 5, at 1552–54. 
82  See Schencker, supra note 7 (“EHR-related issues contributed to less than 1% of all 
claims closed by the malpractice insurer during that time. In that limited sample, 64%, in-
volved user errors while 42% involved issues with the EHR system itself. . . .”). 
83  See id. (“[T]he number of such malpractice suits will likely continue to climb. Medical 
malpractice insurer the Doctors Co. closed 28 claims in 2013 involving EHRs, and nearly 
that many during the first two quarters of 2014. In all, the Doctors Co. closed 97 claims in-
volving EHRs from January 2007 to June 2014.”). 
84  Katie Bo Williams, 4 Reasons We May See More Hospitals Suing IT Vendors, 
HEALTHCAREDIVE (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/4-reasons-we-
may-see-more-hospitals-suing-it-vendors/241663/ [https://perma.cc/WQ6G-4QTK]. 
85  Id. 
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ples of provider lawsuits, with allegations ranging from software not perform-
ing as the vendor had promised,86 software failing to meet contractual deadlines 
necessary to meet federal regulation requirements,87 software causing budget 
shortfalls in the billions,88 and allegations of fraud and breach of contract in 
connection with errors in the EHR compromising patient safety,89 just to name 
a few. It is somewhat unsurprising that these lawsuits are on the rise given how 
much providers spend to purchase, implement, and maintain EHR systems, 
which many providers did not want to transition to in the first place.90 In 2015, 
Becker’s Health IT & CIO Review reported on a few of the costly investments 
that large providers had made in EHR systems, which included an estimated 
$1.2 billion investment by Partners HealthCare in Boston, $200 million by the 
Lehigh Valley Health Network, and “hundreds of millions” by the Mayo Clin-
ic.91 Even small providers spend a large portion of their total revenue on EHR 
licensing, implementation, and maintenance.92 Entities that make large invest-
                                                        
86  Joseph Conn, Cerner, Trinity Reach $106M Settlement in Software Dispute, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140307/news/303 
079954 [https://perma.cc/MKR4-W52C] (noting the parties settled Trinity Health’s allega-
tions that Cerner’s financial software was defective causing an estimated $240 million worth 
of damages to Trinity’s North Dakota hospital). 
87  See Eve Byron, White Sulphur Springs Hospital Says Company Never Installed Health 
Records System, INDEP. RECORD (Dec. 31, 2013), http://helenair.com/news/local/white-
sulphur-springs-hospital-says-company-never-installed-health-records/article_cce3a646-
71e3-11e3-aa07-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/65RK-GV6Z] (noting that Moun-
tainview Medical Center sued its EHR vendor, NextGen Healthcare Information Systems of 
Texas, for its failure to install a certified health record system by June 1, 2013, as necessary 
for the hospital to meet “meaningful use” regulations and the hospital spent over $441,000 to 
arrange for installment of an EHR that was not compliance with applicable federal stand-
ards). 
88  See Plaintiff-Appellants’ Response to Petition for Discretionary Review at 7–8, Abrons 
Family Practice and Urgent Care, P.A. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 792 S.E.2d 
528 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 427A16) (claiming that the State of North Carolina imple-
mented a software system (NCTracks) for its Medicaid program that was riddled with errors, 
causing payments to “Medicaid providers [to be] delayed, unpaid, or shorted by over half a 
billion dollars in the first 90 days. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
89  See Schencker, supra note 7 (detailing a lawsuit, which has since been settled, between 
PinnacleHealth and Cerner (as successor in interest to Siemens health IT business) in which 
Cerner sued PinnacleHealth for breach of contract when PinnacleHealth cancelled its con-
tract and instead contracted with Epic Systems Corp., and PinnacleHealth then countersued 
for fraud and breach of contract alleging Cerner’s product was defective and caused patient 
safety concerns). 
90  See Dawn Heisey-Grove et al., A National Study of Challenges to Electronic Health Rec-
ord Adoption and Meaningful Use, 52 MED. CARE 144, 146–47 (2014), http://journals.lw 
w.com/lww-medicalcare/Documents/13-00342.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKV9-MDUY]. 
91  See 8 Epic EHR Implementations with the Biggest Price Tags in 2015, BECKER’S HEALTH 
IT & CIO REVIEW (Jul. 1, 2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-
information-technology/8-epic-ehr-implementations-with-the-biggest-price-tags-in-
2015.html [https://perma.cc/S5LY-7R5Z]. 
92  See Schencker, supra note 7. 
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ments in IT infrastructure have an expectation that EHR systems should not on-
ly function, but function as promised and in a manner that should make clinical 
care easier and not harder.93 As more and more providers spend more money 
implementing EHR systems per requirements under HIPAA and HITECH, their 
expectations for the functionality and ease of their EHR systems and respon-
siveness of EHR vendors increase, leading to a heightened litigious environ-
ment. 
II. THE ECLINICALWORKS SETTLEMENT AND FRAUD AMONG EHR VENDORS 
A. eClinicalWorks Settlement 
It is with this backdrop of an increasingly litigious environment of the EHR 
industry that the DOJ announced its recent settlement with eCW, a leading 
EHR vendor,94 for alleged violations of the FCA.95 As news of the settlement 
spread across the health care industry, many have asked whether this is an indi-
cator of what might be a new normal when it comes to EHR vendors, or if this 
is an isolated incident based on some specific and particularly egregious facts.96 
The settlement resolved two alleged FCA violations: (a) that eCW paid 
kickbacks to certain customers in order to induce those customers to promote 
its product, and (b) that eCW obtained certification for its EHR software that 
resulted in payments to its customer-providers when the software, to the actual 
knowledge of eCW, did not comply with the requirements necessary for certifi-
cation.97 Although not addressed extensively in the federal government’s press 
release about the settlement, the case initially arose out of complaints made by 
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses who used eCW software at the women’s 
hospital at Rikers Island jail in New York City in 2010 and who alleged that the 
software was malfunctioning in a way that compromised patient safety.98 Com-
plaints regarding the software malfunctions were initially directed to Brendan 
Delaney, a former eCW employee, who worked on implementation of the EHR 
                                                        
93  Id. 
94  eClinicalWorks Holds Highest Market Share for Ambulatory Cloud-Based EHRs, 
BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REVIEW (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.beckershospitalreview.c 
om/healthcare-information-technology/eclinicalworks-holds-highest-market-share-for-ambu 
latory-cloud-based-ehrs.html [https://perma.cc/KC3E-R75N] (reporting that eClinicalWorks 
holds the highest market share of all cloud-based EHR vendors, which accounts for about ten 
percent of the market share). 
95  See Press Release, supra note 10. 
96  See Allen, supra note 12; see also Landi, supra note 14 (“Considering the implications of 
the fraud allegations, Bob Ramsey, an attorney who focuses on healthcare as a sharehold-
er/partner at the Pittsburgh, Pa.-based law firm Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney, says the case 
should serve as a wake-up call to health IT vendors about the importance of being compliant 
with certification requirements.”). 
97  See Press Release, supra note 10. 
98  See Allen, supra note 12. 
18 NEV. L.J. 735, FARRINGER  - FINAL 5/15/18  12:22 PM 
Spring 2018] THE COMPUTER MADE ME DO IT 751 
system on Rikers Island and later at over thirty other hospitals.99 Most of the 
fraud allegations initially related to patient safety issues, such as patient records 
that overlapped on computer screens causing confusion about a particular pa-
tient’s diagnosis or prescribed drugs, errors within medication lists, and patients 
leaving jail without proper prescriptions or lab results.100 The DOJ’s complaint-
in-intervention, however, emphasized false claims related to eCW’s representa-
tions under the EHR Incentive Program as established under the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.101 
The EHR Incentive Program was created to spur more widespread adoption 
of EHRs and to incentivize Medicare and Medicaid participating providers 
(physicians and hospitals) to become “meaningful users” of certified EHR 
technology (CEHRT).102 These incentives include both bonus payments in the 
initial years and then an assessment of penalties for those who fail to become 
“meaningful users” in later years.103 Payments can be made under either the 
Medicare program or the Medicaid program, at the choice of the provider, and 
amounts are paid out in established time frames depending on the program.104 
The payments were maximized for those professionals who became eligible in 
2011, but decreased in total payment amounts for those not becoming eligible 
until a later date.105 The Medicare program requires eligible professionals to 
begin the incentive payments by 2014 and the Medicaid program allows eligi-
ble providers to start the program as late as 2016.106 After the expiration of the 
incentive periods, eligible professionals who do not successfully demonstrate 
meaningful use will face payment adjustments to their Medicare reimburse-
ments.107 
                                                        
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  The HITECH Act was established under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 in Division A, Title XIII. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.L. 
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17, 2009); United States’ Complaint in Intervention at 1, U.S. ex 
rel. Delaney v. eClinicalWorks, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00095-WKS (D. Vt. May 12, 2017). 
102  42 U.S.C. § 300jj(1) (2009) (defining a “certified EHR technology” as “a qualified elec-
tronic health record that is certified pursuant to section 3001(c)(5) as meeting standards . . . 
applicable to the type of record involved”); United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra 
note 101, at 1. 
103  EHR Incentive Programs, HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/providers-
professionals/ehr-incentive-programs [https://perma.cc/KH7J-EMRY] (last visited Apr. 6, 
2018) [hereinafter EHR Incentive Programs]. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and -Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncen 
tivePrograms/Basics.html [https://perma.cc/HXL2-P2SB] (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
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One of the key features of being eligible for the incentive programs is 
adoption and meaningful use of CEHRT.108 To determine what qualifies as 
CEHRT, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Of-
fice of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) de-
veloped standards and other technical criteria that EHR software would be re-
quired to meet in order for EHR vendors to be able to market their products as 
certified under EHR Incentive Programs.109 Under the certification program, 
organizations may seek certification status from an ONC-Authorized Certifica-
tion Body (ONC-ACB) that will be responsible for certifying and monitoring 
CEHRTs during the initial period of certification in accordance with the stand-
ards adopted by CMS and ONC.110 Once an EHR has been certified, it is then 
added to a database maintained by the ONC that lists all CEHRTs and other 
pertinent information regarding CEHRTs that are then eligible for incentive 
payments.111 Given that adoption of a CEHRT is a key feature of the require-
ments for the EHR Incentive Program, it can be potentially very lucrative for an 
EHR company to become certified because providers that want to access the 
incentive payments can only do so through a CEHRT.112 
The program has had huge success in getting providers to adopt EHRs—
especially EHRs with the necessary capabilities to create greater efficiencies in 
the system, including e-prescribing capabilities.113 CMS reported, “As of De-
cember 2017, more than 542,600 health care providers received payment for 
participating in the Medicare and Medicaid [EHR] Incentive Programs.”114 This 
strong participation has resulted in payments of over twenty-four billion under 
the Medicare program and over twelve billion under the Medicaid program.115 
                                                        
108  42 U.S.C. § 300jj-51 (2016). 
109  Certified EHR Technology, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. [hereinafter Certi-
fied EHR Technology], https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIn 
centivePrograms/Certification.html [https://perma.cc/K53P-WLXR] (last visited Apr. 6, 
2018). 
110  45 C.F.R. § 170.501 (2018); see also United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra 
note 101, at 6. 
111  Certified Health IT Product List, HEALTHIT.GOV (2017), https://chpl.healthit.gov/#/search 
[https://perma.cc/SA2Y-SLTL] (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
112  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 6; see Certified Health IT 
Product List, supra note 111. 
113  See JAWANNA HENRY ET AL., ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS 
AMONG U.S. NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS: 2008–2015, ONC DATA BRIEF 35 (May 
2016), https://dashboard.healthit.gov/evaluations/data-briefs/non-federal-acute-care-hospital-
ehr-adoption-2008-2015.php [https://perma.cc/UCN4-RNLF]. 
114  Data and Program Reports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-guidance/legislation/ehrincentiveprograms/dataandrep 
orts.html [https://perma.cc/TWF7-D5Y5] (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
115  Id.; see also EHR Incentive Program Summary, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentiveProg 
rams/Downloads/December2017_MedicareEHRIncentivePayments.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7BRB-24KF] (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). 
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Given the large sums of money the federal government is spending in connec-
tion with this program, it is unsurprising that any allegation regarding fraudu-
lent practices conducted specifically to receive payment prompted the govern-
ment’s swift response. 
Thus, in the DOJ’s Complaint In Intervention in United States ex rel. 
Delaney v. eClinicalWorks, LLC,116 the government focused its FCA liability 
claim on allegations that eCW manipulated its software to ensure that it would 
pass the certification test, enabling eCW to market its product to providers as 
meeting necessary certification requirements for purposes of securing the EHR 
incentive payments.117 Specifically, the DOJ stated that eCW caused providers 
to submit false or fraudulent claims to the government because it: 
(a) [F]alsely attested to its certifying body that it met the certification criteria; 
(b) prepared its software in order to pass certification testing without meeting 
the certification criteria; (c) caused its users to falsely attest to using a certified 
EHR technology, when [eCW’s] software could not support the applicable certi-
fication criteria in the field; and (d) caused its users to report inaccurate infor-
mation regarding Meaningful Use objectives and measures in attestations to the 
[CMS].118 
The most egregious claims that the government emphasized in the settle-
ment agreement related to claims regarding the manner in which the eCW 
software was able to use so-called RxNorm codes119 in connection with the e-
prescribing capabilities of the software.120 The government claimed that eCW 
first reviewed the standardized testing protocols that would be used by the ap-
plicable NCO-ACB, which identified the specific steps that an EHR vendor 
would be required to complete during the testing process.121 eCW was thus 
aware that testing of the protocols for certification would require the identifica-
tion and prescribing of sixteen specific drugs under the RxNorm require-
ment.122 In order to meet certification requirements, the software should have 
                                                        
116  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 9. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 1–2. 
119  One of the certification requirements is that the software must be able to prescribe drugs 
electronically using the RxNorm codes set forth under the applicable protocols. Id. at 9. 
RxNorm is “a normalized naming system for generic and branded drugs; and a tool for sup-
porting semantic interoperation between drug terminologies and pharmacy knowledge base 
systems.” Unified Medical Language System (UMLS), U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorm/overview.html [https://perma.cc/4WKN-B6 
NE] (last visited Apr. 6, 2018). The goal of utilizing RxNorm is to ensure that computers are 
using a normalized language to effectively communicate drug-related information. Id. 
120  Press Release, supra note 10. 
121  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 7. Such protocols were pub-
licly available in advance to EHR vendors so that the vendors could anticipate what proto-
cols would be part of the test. Thus, reviewing the protocols alone was not anything nefari-
ous or illegal. Id. 
122  Id. at 10. 
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been able to prescribe all pharmaceuticals based on utilization of RxNorm and 
not based on other pharmaceutical identifiers; but, for purposes of the specific 
certification test, only those specific sixteen drugs were to be tested.123 Armed 
with such information, eCW representatives then “hardcoded”124 the sixteen 
specific drug codes in order to assure that the software would pass the RxNorm 
portion of the test, even though the software itself was not able to prescribe 
drugs pursuant to the certification protocol.125 eCW not only used this method 
for purposes of passing the test for the initial certification in 2013, but also used 
it on a retest in 2014.126 Because eCW passed its initial tests and continued to 
pass tests related to RxNorm, its product was certified on July 24, 2013, and its 
certification was maintained during the initial certification period.127 Despite 
eCW’s awareness that its current methods did not comply with certification cri-
terion, eCW did not make certification-conforming changes after receiving cer-
tification and continued to market and sell its product as a CEHRT.128 
In addition to the issues related to the RxNorm codes, there were a number 
of other problems related to other aspects of certification that the complaint 
against eCW identified. These other problems included errors with patient edu-
cation criterion, inadequate testing, unreliable version control, inability to cre-
ate batch export reports,129 inability to create accurate audit logs, inaccurate re-
cording of diagnostic imaging orders, and unreliable performance of drug to 
drug and drug to allergy checks.130 Key in connection with all of these errors, 
                                                        
123  Id. It should be noted that eCW’s software was not entirely without the capability to e-
prescribe. While it was not transmitting the RxNorm codes in accordance with the certifica-
tion requirements, it developed a work around in which the software either utilized proprie-
tary drug identifiers as developed by private business partners or utilized National Drug 
Codes. Id. at 11. National Drug Codes are an identifier established by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) under the Drug Listing Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. § 360. Each drug 
product is “identified and reported using a unique, three-segment number, called the Nation-
al Drug Code (NDC), which serves as a universal product identifier for drugs.” National 
Drug Code Directory, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (last visited Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm142438.htm [https://perma.cc/Z448-
4TUM]. The FDA maintains a database of the NDC number that is assigned to each drug 
and using the numbers for purposes of enforcing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
Id. 
124  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 10 (noting that “rather than 
programming the capability to retrieve any code from the entire database of RxNorm codes, 
ECW simply typed the sixteen RxNorm codes necessary for testing directly into its soft-
ware. . . . for the purpose of making its certification body believe it had implemented the 
RxNorm drug vocabulary and to pass certification testing”). 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 10–11. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 16. 
129  To be certified, an EHR system must be able to create a set of export summaries of all 
patients in the database and the eCW software was unable to perform this function, which 
customers noted to eCW personnel. Id. at 14. 
130  Id. at 13–16. 
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and key for purposes of assuring that eCW had sufficient knowledge of its ac-
tivity as required under the FCA,131 was that eCW became aware of the is-
sues—primarily via complaints from customers after experiencing errors with 
the product132—but failed to correct or rectify most, if any, of the problems un-
til 2016, after eCW had come under investigation by the federal government.133 
Unlike the claim regarding eCW’s overt actions with the manipulation of 
the sixteen drug codes to facilitate passing the certification test, the remainder 
of the claims against eCW related to issues that could be considered problemat-
ic because they potentially compromised patient safety or created challenges 
for the customers in terms of work flow or efficiency in the delivery of care.134 
To the extent that the government was alleging that any inadequacies and tech-
nical challenges with the use of eCW’s software were somehow fraudulent (as 
opposed to simply usual software bugs or glitches)135 under the FCA, the gov-
ernment’s allegations hinge on the fact that eCW was aware of the problems 
with the software and failed to rectify them. It is unrealistic and virtually im-
possible to claim that CEHRT software will be flawless and will always func-
tion in accordance with all the EHR Incentive Program’s criteria at all times 
and with no flaws. Thus, it seems the government in the eCW complaint at-
tempted to distinguish between situations in which the EHR vendor corrects 
any software bugs or flaws as soon as it is aware of such bugs or flaws versus a 
vendor that seems to be aware of the issues and consciously does nothing to 
remedy or fix the issues.136 The latter is a necessary component of whether this 
behavior could be considered fraudulent. This distinction could be difficult to 
differentiate, and there seems to be little guidance from the eCW settlement 
agreement as to when an EHR vendor response might be adequate and when it 
could instead constitute fraud. 
                                                        
131  To sustain a claim alleging violations of the FCA, one must prove that the entity alleged 
to have violated the FCA had “knowledge” of its actions, which includes deliberate igno-
rance, reckless disregard, and actual knowledge. See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. 
Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 380 (1st Cir. 2011). 
132  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 12. 
133  Id. at 11–13, 15. It was noted in the complaint that eCW knew that it was under investi-
gation at least by Dec. 23, 2016. Id. at 11. 
134  See id. at 12–16. 
135  It is quite common after software is released for either the company or users to discover 
certain errors or security bugs and then the company issues updates or “patches” to fix the 
errors. For example, within twenty-four hours of Apple releasing its new Mac operating sys-
tem, Apple had discovered and released a software update to address a security bug in the 
system that would have allowed anyone to gain unauthorized and full administrator control 
into a Mac running the latest operating system without a password. See Mark Gurman, Apple 
Releases Fix to Security Flaw in Mac Operating System, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017, 
2:16 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-28/apple-mac-operating-sys 
tem-has-login-flaw-that-puts-data-at-risk [https://perma.cc/Y9FB-U5Y5]. 
136  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 11–15. 
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Similarly, the complaint also resolved allegations of violations of the AKS 
in connection with unlawful remuneration to customers who referred other cus-
tomers or recommended eCW’s products.137 Specifically, the complaint alleged 
that eCW conducted a “referral program” that paid for referrals by one custom-
er of another customer, a “site visit program” in which eCW paid current users 
to host other customers at their practice site to promote eCW’s software, and a 
“reference program” that involved payments to current users to serve as refer-
ences for prospective customers.138 Lastly, the DOJ also alleged that eCW was 
paying physicians—both in cash and in kind—“consultant” or “speaker” fees to 
promote software.139 
While these claims are referenced in the complaint, it is possible they were 
included at eCW’s request to assure that no other FCA claims could be filed 
against eCW in connection with the conduct and to assure that neither the Of-
fice of Inspector General nor the DOJ could file any claims at a later time based 
on AKS violations for the same period.140 It is not clear, however, whether the 
claims would be actionable if the FCA claim had instead been based solely on 
the AKS allegations and did not also involve the claims associated with the de-
liberate manipulation of the software under the EHR Incentive Program. For 
example, the complaint does not reference how many payments to physicians 
under any of the above-referenced programs resulted in referrals for software 
used by other customers that were then actually reimbursed by federal 
healthcare programs.141 Certainly, there is evidence that eCW sought certifica-
tion for the sole purpose of being able to seek payment under the EHR Incen-
tive Program; thus, to the extent that payments were made to physicians with 
the intention of inducing those physicians to refer other providers to purchase 
eCW products for reimbursement under the EHR Incentive Program, it would 
seem that is a clear violation of the AKS.142 It is not clear from the complaint, 
however, how successful such programs were and how many claims resulted 
from the remunerations or kickbacks paid.143 This is an important distinction 
for purposes of contemplating application of the FCA to future cases involving 
EHR vendors because, unlike pharmaceutical products or medical devices, 
                                                        
137  Id. at 17. 
138  Id. at 17–18. 
139  Id. at 18. 
140  Jonathan Cone et al., Negotiating False Claims Act Settlements, BRIEFING PAPERS (Feb. 
2014), https://www.crowell.com/files/Negotiating-False-Claims-Act-Settlements.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/HW3Y-4CCG] (advising clients in connection with an FCA settlement to “negoti-
ate the broadest possible release by writing the broadest definition of covered conduct”). 
141  To sustain a claim under the AKS, one must eventually prove that the federal government 
made a payment under a federal healthcare program for a service that was rendered either 
due to or involving an illegal solicitation or receipt of remuneration. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b 
(2012). 
142  See id.; United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 17–18. 
143  See United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 17–18. 
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EHR systems, in and of themselves, are not necessarily reimbursable under 
federal healthcare programs144—although some courts have allowed reim-
bursement to be inclusive of items that may be part of other payments.145 Re-
gardless, due to the unique nature of EHRs and the unique nature of the EHR 
Incentive Program’s involvement in the eCW case, the viability of an AKS 
claim as the basis for an FCA claim against EHR vendors more generally re-
mains somewhat untested despite this settlement agreement resolving such 
claims. 
B. Fraud Among EHR Vendors 
Some might examine the eCW settlement agreement and related FCA alle-
gations as simply one egregious example of blatant deception, given the know-
ing and deliberate act of hardcoding the software for the purpose of receiving 
certification under the EHR Incentive Program.146 Many in the EHR Vendor 
industry have been rightly concerned, however, about what the case means for 
the purpose of trying to determine what might or might not constitute fraud in 
the EHR context and what it means for other vendors.147 While the “hardcod-
ing” allegations were about a specific incident, many of the other allegations 
                                                        
144  Pharmaceutical drugs are directly reimbursed by the Medicare program under Medicare 
Part D, and many states include prescription drugs as covered by certain Medicaid programs. 
See How to Get Drug Coverage, MEDICARE.GOV (last visited Apr. 6, 2018) 
https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/get-drug-coverage/get-drug-coverage.html 
[https://perma.cc/2VYN-KQ35] (describing Medicare’s prescription drug coverage and how 
to enroll); see also Prescription Drugs, MEDICAID.GOV (last visited Apr. 6, 2018) 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/index.html [https://perma.cc/7XEV-
K7L2] (noting that pharmacy coverage is an option benefit, but that all states provide cover-
age in some form). Medical devices are perhaps more akin to pharmaceutical products be-
cause the products themselves are reimbursed under some federal healthcare programs. See 
United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 394 (1st Cir. 
2011) (describing that medical devices are part of the calculation of the diagnosis-related 
group that Medicare pays a hospital for a particular service, although the devices are not sep-
arately itemized or reimbursed at cost). 
145  Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d at 394. (finding that even though the hospitals and 
physicians may not have submitted claims that directly reimbursed the specific medical de-
vices, that “[w]e cannot say that, as a matter of law, the alleged misrepresentations in the 
hospital and physician claims were not capable of influencing Medicare’s decision to pay the 
claims” because “[t]he intricacies of the DRG system do not alter the clear language of the 
Provider Agreement and the Hospital Cost Report Forms.”). 
146  In its defense, eCW responded to allegations about the specific charges related to 
RxNorm codes by stating that it was an inadvertent error that was corrected upon discovery. 
A representative of eCW wrote, “The failure to include RxNorm codes in electronic pre-
scriptions was completely inadvertent on the part of eClinicalWorks, as our software used 
RxNorm codes in other parts of the system, such as in C-CDAs. We gained nothing by not 
including the codes, which are available for free from the National Library of Medicine. We 
resolved this issue as soon as we learned of it.” See Landi, supra note 14. 
147  See id. (discussing a healthcare attorney saying this case should serve as a wake-up call 
to health IT vendors about compliance). 
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related to eCW’s failure to immediately correct known issues.148 EHR vendors 
watching this case were left wondering what the eCW case means for purposes 
of fixing known bugs or glitches within the software. How soon after a problem 
is discovered does a software error need to be corrected? Is there time to see if 
other issues arise? Might some of the issues be related to specific systems be-
cause of legacy software? How often must software be updated? Are some 
glitches okay and some not? Will issues that cause patient safety problems be 
seen as more important or less important than issues that cause financial inju-
ries like improper billing? 
Certainly, there are myriad questions, but not necessarily a lot of guidance 
or answers to those questions from the eCW settlement agreement. One can see 
the potential for these types of issues to bleed over into other areas, even other 
applications of the FCA. On August 24, 2016, three hospitals in the state of 
New York settled Medicaid fraud charges alleging that they failed to pay 
known overpayments within the sixty days required to remit known overpay-
ments.149 Under amendments to the FCA enacted as part of the Affordable Care 
Act,150 the FCA now makes it a false claim to retain any known overpayments 
for a period of greater than sixty days.151 In the New York case, a software 
glitch in the hospitals’ billing system caused the erroneous billing of 444 claims 
to the Medicaid program during 2009 and 2010.152 The three hospitals were no-
tified by an individual employee about the software glitch, thus putting the 
hospitals on notice of the possibility of erroneous billing.153 While the hospitals 
eventually remitted the overpayments, the remittance trickled in over a period 
of two years (from 2011 to 2013) rather than within the sixty days that is re-
quired pursuant to the FCA.154 The employee who had alerted the hospitals to 
the known error had been fired, and he eventually became the qui tam relator in 
the case.155 
While this particular FCA action was directed at the hospitals, one could 
see how this exact scenario could equally implicate an EHR vendor. Imagine 
that instead of an employee discovering the glitch and informing appropriate 
executives within the company, an employee at the EHR vendor discovers a 
                                                        
148  See United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 11–16. 
149  See Kane ex rel. United States v. Healthfirst, Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y 
2015); see also Jonathan Stempel, New York City Hospitals Settle Medicaid Repayment 
Fraud Charges, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
new-york-hospitals-settlement/new-york-city-hospitals-settle-medicaid-repayment-fraud-
charges-idUSKCN10Z2KC [https://perma.cc/W7LT-GW88]. 
150  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012). 
151  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012) (“[K]nowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly 
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”). 
152  See Stempel, supra note 149. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
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similar glitch that is causing thousands of dollars in overpayments to the Medi-
care or Medicaid programs, or both. Assume that the employee notifies execu-
tives at the EHR vendor, but the executives are concerned about the damages 
that an announcement about the error might have on the company’s reputation 
and realize that fixing the error would be time intensive and expensive. The ex-
ecutives therefore decide to get one of their current coders to work on a patch, 
which they will release in about six months—during the summer months when 
everyone is on vacation and fewer people will take notice of the patch. Could 
the employee at the EHR vendor file an FCA claim alleging that the vendor 
failing to notify any customers of the known software error and that not cor-
recting the error until several months after the fact constitutes a false claim?156 
Indeed, once one begins to review existing claims against EHR vendors, 
especially those claims between provider-customers and the vendor based on 
breach of contract, many of the allegations arise out of failure on the vendor’s 
part to deliver the product in the manner in which it was promised; or, said an-
other way, the failure of the software to perform as desired and anticipated.157 
To the extent that a software issue is the cause of, or contributes to, a situation 
in which a provider submits claims that are false, fraudulent, or a misrepresen-
tation of the services actually provided, the EHR vendor is not only potentially 
liable in a direct claim against the provider, but also potentially exposed to 
FCA actions. This liability, however, must be premised on all factors necessary 
to sustain an FCA claim, including “knowledge” on the part of the vendor, 
claims submitted to federal healthcare programs, and claims that are material to 
the government’s decision to pay the claim.158 
The challenge remains, however, to determine at what point a glitch in the 
software or known bug or error in the coding turns from simply common and 
necessary software maintenance to fraudulent practices. Are any of the lawsuits 
against the existing vendors examples of such neglect or lack of attention that 
vendors’ lack of action has transitioned into fraud? Where does the line be-
tween fraud and inattention fall, and does the eCW settlement agreement give 
vendors—or even qui tam relators—guidance on that question? 
                                                        
156  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (“[K]nowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, 
a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to 
the Government. . . .”). It does not seem that a qui tam relator could in fact sustain an FCA 
claim for knowingly causing another entity to conceal “or knowingly and improperly 
avoid[ing] or decreas[ing] an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Gov-
ernment,” known as a “reverse false claim.” Indeed, there is no “causes to” language in the 
second half of subsection G, but it seems it would fit squarely into the idea that the software 
vendor’s action of not correcting the error is causing another to make or use a false record or 
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money. 
157  See Landi, supra note 14. 
158  31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
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III. FALSE CLAIMS ACT LIABILITY FOR EHR VENDORS 
Jeffrey Smith, vice president of policy at American Medical Informatics 
Association, has stated, 
[The eCW case] really highlights how benign glitches can have far-reaching im-
pacts to patient safety. I imagine every single CIO out there understands this no-
tion very well, because while we suffer through computer glitches and little hic-
cups on smartphones—in healthcare, a glitch can be the difference between life 
and death. . . . And, I anticipate that the $155 million that the government is get-
ting is only the beginning.159 
In the years since the enactment of HIPAA and HITECH, the informatics 
side of healthcare has enjoyed a relatively liability free existence due not only 
to contracting practices such as hold-harmless provisions and indemnification 
clauses, but also the complication of human error as an intervening or contribu-
tory factor in negligence and general legal doctrines such as the learned inter-
mediary doctrine.160 As provider usage and reliance on EHR systems has in-
creased, however, there has also been a marked rise in the prevalence of claims 
not only medical malpractice claims from patients, but breach of contract 
claims from customers and providers.161 
Given this increased use and reliance on electronic systems is primarily the 
result of the $24 billion that the federal government spent incentivizing provid-
ers to join the digital age, the eCW settlement agreement is perhaps less sur-
prising than it may first appear. While the bulk of FCA claims are against pro-
viders and suppliers that contract directly with federal healthcare programs, the 
DOJ has great financial success162 with FCA claims premised on the induce-
ment-of-fraud theory against entities such as pharmaceutical companies and 
device manufacturers.163 Based on the eCW case and the alleged fraud under 
the settlement agreement, it is likely that the use of the FCA to address fraud 
                                                        
159  See Landi, supra note 14. 
160  See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
161  See Landi, supra note 14. 
162  This Article references monetary success because it is undisputed that the largest settle-
ment amounts under the FCA have been achieved through settlement agreements with phar-
maceutical companies for AKS violations or promotion of drugs for off-label use. See Set-
tlements & Judgments, supra note 37. Whether such settlement amounts have been 
successful in deterring pharmaceutical companies or their executives from certain illegal be-
haviors is not necessarily clear, however. Regarding a successful drug that is still protected 
by an existing patient—thus providing the pharmaceutical company the opportunity to effec-
tively set the price of the pharmaceutical at any price that it desires—a pharmaceutical com-
pany might be willing to pay any associated fees, penalties, or settlement amounts because 
the benefits from the illegal behavior outweigh the assessment of fines and penalties. See 
Krause, supra note 41, at 404–05. Thus, for certain drugs that might be extremely marketa-
ble across a large population, the risk of entering into a settlement for illegal activity might 
simply be viewed as a “cost of doing business.” See id. at 429 (quoting William N. Sage, 
Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA 1179, 1180 (1999)). 
163  See Kwok, supra note 27, at 215. 
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and misrepresentation in the EHR industry will continue. While FCA cases 
against pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers can serve 
as good examples for EHR vendors and what they might come to expect, the 
distinctions and unique characteristics of EHR vendors and the EHR industry 
relative to the pharmaceutical industry and its practices make it unlikely that 
the government will have as much success with application of the FCA against 
EHR vendors as with pharmaceutical companies. 
A. Distinctions Between Pharmaceutical Companies and EHR Vendors 
It is undisputed that even with fewer FCA cases alleged against pharma-
ceutical manufacturers,164 the amount that the government has been able to re-
cover—inclusive of reimbursement of overpayments, penalties, and treble 
damages—against pharmaceutical companies has been unprecedented.165 Thus, 
even with fewer total cases implicated by the FCA, the pharmaceutical industry 
continues to have a massive impact on the total recovery amount under the 
FCA.166 It further demonstrates the DOJ’s consistent efforts to utilize the FCA 
to enforce the country’s increasingly complex healthcare regulatory scheme by 
targeting not just hospitals, physicians, and other providers who contract direct-
ly with the Medicare and Medicaid programs, but also those large ancillary 
providers and suppliers, such as pharmaceutical companies or medical device 
manufacturers. Although EHR vendors and pharmaceutical companies share 
some characteristics that demonstrate some common liability concerns under 
the FCA, there are many distinctions between these two types of health care en-
tities that will distinguish EHR vendors from pharmaceutical companies, mak-
ing the monetary success for FCA claims against EHR vendors less likely. 
First, as mentioned above, much of the ability to achieve large settlements 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers is attributable to two unique aspects of 
pharmaceutical sales: (a) name-brand drugs, when first introduced in to the 
                                                        
164  Hospitals, clinics, and single providers account for the largest individuals/entities that 
entered into settlements to resolve FCA allegations, which amounted to approximately $585 
million. 2016 Year-End Health Care Compliance and Enforcement Update—Providers, 
GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2016-year-
end-health-care-compliance-and-enforcement-update-providers/ [https://perma.cc/SJ2W-BB 
4F]. 
165  See Settlements & Judgments, supra note 37; see also Press Release, supra note 32 (not-
ing the largest settlement in FCA history with GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) pleading guilty 
and paying $3 billion ($1 billion to resolve criminal charges and $2 billion to resolve civil 
charges) to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from illegal activity related to several 
of its pharmaceutical products). This amount stands in contrast to a total of $4.7 billion that 
was collected for the entire year 2016, which was the third highest annual recovery in the 
history of the FCA. See Press Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-cla 
ims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/7462-6NC4]. 
166  See Settlements & Judgments, supra note 37. 
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market, are almost always “on patent,” meaning that the drugs and their manu-
facturing processes or ingredients, or both, are protected as intellectual property 
rights thus limiting the possibility of competing products for a time;167 and (b) 
once approved for a specific use, drugs can be used for other off-label uses in a 
physician’s medical judgment.168 Thus, during the period that a particular 
pharmaceutical is protected from competition,169 the pharmaceutical company 
is effectively the only seller on the market and it is during the time that most of 
the profit is generated from the drug—and the company’s expenses are re-
couped.170 A pharmaceutical company is limited in its promotion of its product 
through certain restrictions on advertising and misbranding of drugs,171 but 
there are no prohibitions against physicians, in their medical judgment, pre-
scribing a drug for any use, not simply the labeled use.172 Therefore, it is possi-
ble for a pharmaceutical company to generate profits not just based on the use 
for which a drug was approved, but for any number of off-label uses.173 To the 
extent a drug can be prescribed for more uses, the customer base widens, and 
                                                        
167  To encourage innovation and creation of new drugs, federal law enables pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to file for patent protection for certain aspects of a drug, including its active 
ingredients, the process of its manufacturing, etc. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable 
Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 507–08 (2009). 
168  See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit 
of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 61–62 
(2008). 
169  In addition to patent law, there are other protections under the Food and Drug Admin-
istration that would also protect the time for which a drug manufacturer has to promote its 
drug. See Rongxiang Liu, Pharma’s Strategies on Fighting Generics and Healthcare Re-
form, 3 BIOTECH. & PHARMACEUTICAL L. REV. 26, 32 (2010) (“Title I also provides an incen-
tive to Pharma for innovations, which is the right of exclusivity. The exclusivity period for 
an innovative brand drug is the time period in which no ANDA can be approved, regardless 
the status of the patent protecting the brand drug. Therefore, Pharma’s exclusivity is inde-
pendent of, but runs in tandem with, patent protection.”). 
170  See Roin, supra note 167, at 507–08. 
171  See Krause, supra note 41, at 405–06 (describing that while there is no direct prohibition 
against promotion of a drug for an off-label use, there are FDA regulations that restrict ad-
vertising in a way that effectively prohibits promotion of an off-label use). 
172  See id. at 405 (citing United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012)); Citizen 
Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration’s Policy on Promotion of Unapproved 
Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820 (Nov. 18, 1994) (quoting 1982 
FDA Drug Bulletin stating that “once a [drug] product has been approved for marketing, a 
physician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens of patient populations that are 
not included in approved labeling”). It should be noted that while there are no prohibitions, 
prescribing a drug for a purpose other than its approved purpose pursuant to its label under 
the FDA could expose the physician to medical malpractice or other negligence or wrongful 
death claims to the extent that such use is not medically appropriate or supported by suffi-
cient medical evidence. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS, 366–77 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that prescribing a drug for an off-label use 
can be used as an affirmative defense, but does not always successfully dismiss a medical 
malpractice claim). 
173  See Johnson, supra note 168, at 70–71. 
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the possibility of greater profits increases due to the wider distribution of the 
drug.174 Thus, even though it might be illegal for a pharmaceutical company to 
promote a drug for off-label use, it may nevertheless be financially advanta-
geous for the company to do so because the penalties and fines that the compa-
ny might pay for the illegal activity may still dwarf the potential profits that can 
be gained through the wider distribution of the drug while still on patent.175 
While there is some ambiguity in the area of what “promotion” might actually 
be illegal, the government has been relatively successful under the FCA in gar-
nering large settlements against pharmaceutical manufacturers for various ac-
tivities implicating promotion of their drugs, including violations of the federal 
AKS.176 
Interestingly, at first glance, the eCW case seems to have a number of simi-
larities to these cases against pharmaceutical companies that could lead one to 
believe that application of the FCA to EHR vendors would be strikingly similar 
to its application to pharmaceutical companies. Much like the actions of drug 
companies to promote a particular product for off-label use during the small 
window in which the product is protected from competition, eCW was alleged 
to have undertaken knowingly fraudulent action during the very narrow win-
dow in which it could become certified under the EHR Incentive Program.177 
Because of the incentive payments and the possibility of customers’ insistence 
upon the purchase of software that met necessary certification requirements 
during that time, eCW was motivated to take whatever actions necessary to en-
sure robust sales to all of these new users entering the market. Indeed, eCW 
generated over $320 million in annual revenue in 2014 and stated that it antici-
pated 15–20 percent growth.178 
                                                        
174  Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Off-Label Drug Promotion, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
3–4 (June 30, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/ []. 
175  Id. at 2. 
176  See Krause, supra note 41, at 417–18. Note that while Krause argues that the FCA has 
been a hugely profitable tool for the federal government against drug companies, she argues 
that a recent opinion raising First Amendment challenges to advertising and marketing off-
label use may disrupt application of the FCA against drug companies for the promotion of 
off-label use because of the inconsistency between application of the FCA versus protections 
under the First Amendment. Id. at 418–19. This Article is not making a determination that 
the FCA is an appropriate tool to combat promotion of off-label use, but simply recognizes 
that the federal government uses the FCA to combat the promotion of off-label use and that 
has been highly successful in its monetary recovery efforts. Likewise, any analysis in this 
Article about the likelihood of the federal government, through the DOJ, utilizing the FCA 
for purposes of combatting abuses in the EHR industry that impact patient safety should not 
be construed to be a conclusion regarding the appropriateness of the FCA for this purpose. 
177  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 9. 
178  Dan Primack, The Software ‘Unicorn’ That Will Never Go Public, FORTUNE (Feb. 13, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/02/13/the-software-unicorn-that-will-never-go-public/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/8GAK-VWHE]. 
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Despite these similarities, there seems to be more divergences than paral-
lels between these two sectors of the health care industry, which might indicate 
a different application of the FCA. Unlike the existing patent structure for 
pharmaceuticals, the facts of the eCW case and the urgency that created incen-
tives for software companies like eCW to seek certification status are finite in 
time.179 The specific facts of the eCW case, wherein the false claim was tied to 
federal monies paid under the EHR Incentive Program, make it not entirely un-
likely that other software companies could face similar allegations for the next 
few years as the monies are paid out, but make it virtually impossible that such 
allegations and activities are actionable on a long term basis once the program 
is over. This should not be read to mean that the eCW case will stand as the 
lone FCA case, but that future cases will have to rely more closely on some of 
the other allegations of the settlement agreement for purposes of sustaining 
claims.180 For example, the original FCA allegations against eCW related more 
so to patient safety concerns caused by eCW’s failure to properly maintain its 
software and allegations of AKS violations arising out of payments made to 
physicians to promote eCW’s software.181 Because of the nature of the “hard-
coding” allegations,182 these other avenues were not explored in as great of 
depth and it is not entirely clear what else would be necessary to prove an FCA 
case not premised on EHR incentive payments. Certainly, to satisfy the 
“knowledge” requirement under the FCA, it would be necessary to show what 
an EHR vendor knew about flaws or glitches in its product, when it knew, its 
reaction (or lack of reaction), and how such glitches affected claims made to 
the federal government. Unlike a pharmaceutical company that has clear incen-
tives to promote off-label products in order to expand the market for buyers or 
to generate greater profits, the incentive for an EHR vendor to ignore or delay 
software malfunctions is not as transparent. As these types of nuances and 
complexities emerge, it appears less and less likely that EHR vendor liability 
under the FCA will closely resemble application of the FCA against pharma-
ceutical companies. 
In addition to some of the structural distinctions between the nature of the 
claims themselves, the market for EHRs and the market for pharmaceuticals is 
exceedingly diverse. One of the consistent challenges for the DOJ in trying to 
consider how to corral drug companies’ marketing and promotion activities is 
weighing the balance between punishing the manufacturer enough to potential-
ly curb behavior without the punishment having residual effect on the patients 
                                                        
179  See EHR Incentive Programs, supra note 103 (noting that payments under the program 
only run through 2021 and payments that are being made on an ongoing basis are only for 
purposes of complying with later stage obligations related to meaningfully using CEHRT—
not simply the purchase of CEHRT). 
180  United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101, at 11–17. 
181  Id. at 13. 
182  See id. at 9–10. 
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who need access to the products.183 An effective deterrent for drug companies 
might simply be to require the company to remove the product from the market 
or exclude the company from federal health care programs, thus preventing the 
manufacturer from generating any profits from the sales.184 While this certainly 
might help to curb illegal behavior, it could be potentially devastating for con-
sumers who are taking the pharmaceutical and need it to treat their particular 
condition. Thus, most enforcement tools against pharmaceutical manufacturers 
come in the form of fines and penalties.185 
EHR products, on the other hand, are vast and many.186 The federal gov-
ernment estimates that “684 health IT developers supply certified health IT to 
354,395 ambulatory primary care physicians, medical and surgical specialists, 
podiatrists, optometrists, dentists, and chiropractors,” and “82% have 2014 cer-
tified edition technology.”187 While there is some market consolidation, there is 
no shortage of products on the market from which customers may choose. 
Thus, to the extent that the DOJ might levy such high penalties or fines so as to 
bankrupt an EHR vendor, it may be an inconvenience to its customers to switch 
to a new platform, but it would not be challenging for such customer to find a 
new vendor, nor would it be entirely uncommon.188 Indeed, under the Corporate 
Integrity Agreement that eCW entered into as part of its settlement agreement 
with the DOJ, eCW was required to offer to all of its customers the option of 
switching to another EHR vendor without assessing any penalties or service 
charges.189 In a report following the settlement, about one third of eCW cus-
                                                        
183  See Lise T. Spacapan & Jill M. Hutchison, Prosecutions of Pharmaceutical Companies 
for Off-Label Marketing: Fueled by Government’s Desire to Modify Corporate Conduct or 
Pursuit of a Lucrative Revenue Stream?, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 407, 421 (2013). 
184  Id. at 419. 
185  It should be noted that this challenge is part of what led to the drafting of the Yates 
Memo and the increased emphasis on trying to prosecute executives who have created a cul-
ture of compliance with companies. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attor-
ney Gen., on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to All U.S. Attorneys, 
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://per 
ma.cc/H2MC-XSZ6]. 
186  See QUICK STATS, supra note 8. 
187  Id. Although there are many vendors, just five vendors supply 2014 certified technology 
to sixty percent of all providers. 
188  See Farringer, supra note 7, at 971. Ironically, an article in Becker’s Health IT & CIO 
Review from 2014 noted a comment that Girish Navani, Chief Executive Officer and co-
founder of eCW, made in 2013 stating that more than half of eCW’s new clients came from 
another vendor. See Helen Gregg, 50 Things to Know About Epic, Cerner, MEDITECH, 
McKesson, athenahealth and Other Major EHR Vendors, BECKER’S HEALTH IT & CIO REV. 
(July 14, 2014), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/ 
50-things-to-know-about-epic-cerner-meditech-mckesson-athenahealth-and-other-major-ehr-
vendors.html [https://perma.cc/53SE-H4TZ]. 
189  Mike Miliard, One-Third of eClinicalWorks Customers Prepping to Switch EHR Ven-
dors, KLAS Says, HEALTH CARE IT NEWS (July 28, 2017, 10:01 AM), http://www.healthcare 
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tomers stated that they were planning on changing to a different vendor, but of 
that one third, only 4 percent stated that their reason for switching was due to 
the settlement agreement with the DOJ.190 What this likely means is that the 
large vendors like eCW have sufficient revenue and customer base that they are 
likely able to absorb any fines or penalties that may be assessed,191 and that any 
similar actions taken against smaller companies would have little impact on 
customers and access to EHR products, even if it meant that the EHR product 
was no longer available.192 
Lastly, the potential profit margins of these two industries are also unique 
and distinct. While perhaps certain aspects of an EHR system could be patenta-
ble, which could set a particular EHR product apart from other similar prod-
ucts, the entire goal of the EHR Incentive Program and the “meaningful use” 
regulations under HITECH is to create uniformity and consistency among EHR 
systems.193 Thus, unlike pharmaceutical companies whose goal is to create a 
new drug that can, for at least a time, enjoy patent protection and thus limited 
competition, an EHR vendor seeking certification is required under law to cre-
ate a product that by its nature will have nearly identical features to other prod-
ucts on the market.194 Certainly, there will be means by which vendors can dis-
tinguish their products from other products based on appearance, ease of use, 
integration with other systems, or customization for certain specialties, but as it 
relates to core functions, the EHR systems must all be able to perform the same 
functions. Thus, not only are there hundreds of competitors in the same market, 
but the distinctions that a vendor can create to make its product superior to oth-
er products is somewhat limited. These limitations will then lead to less price 
variation because there is less of an ability for a vendor to tout their product as 
so far superior to other products that it would warrant a drastically increased 
                                                                                                                                 
itnews.com/news/one-third-eclinicalworks-customers-prepping-switch-ehr-vendors-klas-
says [https://perma.cc/DXM5-L382]. 
190  Id. 
191  eCW stated on its website that it had added more than 3,750 providers in the third quar-
ter, reported revenue of $130 million, and stated that eCW “is now the second most widely 
used EHR in the country.” See Press Release, eClinicalWorks, eClinicalWorks Announces 
Strong Sales Growth, Adding Over 3,750 Providers in Third Quarter and Reporting $130 
Million in Revenue (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.eclinicalworks.com/announcesstrongsales 
growth/ [https://perma.cc/FH4P-P2EQ]. 
192  Tom Sullivan & Jessica Davis, Not Just Epic and Cerner: Hospitals Have Several EHR 
Options If They Abandon eClinicalWorks, HEALTH CARE IT NEWS (June 1, 2017, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/not-just-epic-and-cerner-hospitals-have-several-ehr-
options-if-they-abandon-eclinicalworks [https://perma.cc/EW38-NEXV]. 
193  Marsha R. Gold et al., Obtaining Providers’ ‘Buy-In’ and Establishing Effective Means 
of Information Exchange Will Be Critical to HITECH’s Success, 31 HEALTH AFF. 514, 518 
(2012), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0753 [https://perma.cc/ 
NX3Y-R7W5]. 
194  See generally Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation 
Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 44590 (July 28, 2010) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170). 
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price compared to other vendors.195 So, while many EHR vendors have experi-
enced relatively high profit margins, such profits will never be able to compare 
to the margins that can be generated in the pharmaceutical context, given the 
distinctions in the market place.196 Thus, recovery in the EHR area is much 
more likely to resemble FCA recovery amounts for hospitals or other providers, 
but not necessarily similar to amounts recoverable in the pharmaceutical con-
text. 
Despite that, on its face, the eCW complaint-in-intervention looks as 
though it is right out of the DOJ playbook for FCA application against pharma-
ceutical companies.197 It seems unlikely, however, that the eCW case will set 
off widespread application of FCA actions against EHR vendors in a manner 
similar to the pharmaceutical industry. The EHR Incentive Program will have 
limited long-term use and, outside of this program, these two sectors seem too 
disparate and unique to be able to draw conclusions as to one based on applica-
tion of the FCA under another. It seems unlikely that EHR vendors will contin-
ue to enjoy the limited liability that has existed since the advent of EHRs into 
the market, and certainly this is likely not the last we will hear from qui tam re-
lators or the federal government about EHR systems. What these cases will 
look like in the future, however, and what their effect on the market will be 
generally has yet to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
According to HealthIT.gov, 
The main goal of health IT is to improve the quality and safety of patient care. 
The promise of fully realized EHRs is having a single record that includes all of 
                                                        
195  HealthIT.gov, a government sponsored website to assist providers and professionals with 
transitioning to an EHR, provides advice on how to select a vendor on its “Frequently Asked 
Questions” page, and also provides several comparison tools so that a consumer can compare 
functionalities in the Vendor Evaluation Matrix Tool, meaningful use capabilities under the 
Vendor Meaningful Use Compare Tool, and pricing under the Vendor Pricing Template. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/frequently-asked-questions/425#id93 
[https://perma.cc/3MGP-8PVP] (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). Thus, with these tools, vendors 
are unlikely to create a product that strays too far from a competitor’s product or set a price 
too much higher than other pricing unless there is a clear way to distinguish your product 
from another product. 
196  It is acknowledged that the availability for patent protection in the pharmaceutical con-
text is because of the high research and development costs associated with getting a drug to 
market and the necessary incentives that must be created to induce companies to incur such 
costs in the beginning stages of a new product. EHR systems do not have similar research 
and development costs or lengthy approval processes equivalent to the FDA approval pro-
cess. The period during which drugs are patent protected, however, has often enabled drug 
companies to not just recoup their expenses, but generate profits far exceeding any related 
expenses. This is not a commentary on whether those systems are providing proper incen-
tives, but merely recognizing distinctions between the industries. 
197  See generally United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 101. 
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a patient’s health information: a record that is up to date, complete, and accurate. 
This puts providers in a better position to work with their patients to make good 
decisions.198 
As the health care industry works to implement EHRs to achieve these 
goals, both EHR vendors and customers are experiencing the inevitable grow-
ing pains of trying to figure out healthcare delivery in the new age of electron-
ics. 
After two decades of working together to implement new systems, it seems 
that the responsibility that EHR vendors have in the health care delivery system 
may finally be starting to be recognized—both for its benefits and for its faults. 
While EHR vendor liability in medical malpractice and breach of contract 
claims has already increased, the eCW settlement agreement represents the first 
of its kind utilizing the FCA to combat fraudulent activity in the EHR indus-
try.199 Based on the unique facts of the eCW case, the settlement may not serve 
as a predictor of the filing of hundreds of similar FCA claims under the EHR 
Incentive Program in the same way that the DOJ has used the promotion of off-
label use and the AKS against pharmaceutical companies. However, it should 
stand as a cautionary tale to the EHR industry regarding FCA liability more 
generally. Many of the claims in the eCW complaint highlight some of the ac-
tivities and behaviors of EHR vendors that the DOJ might deem suspect, even 
outside the context of the EHR Incentive Program. While the facts of eCW may 
stand alone, the DOJ is putting vendors on notice to the expectations of the 
government when it comes to correcting known errors, performing necessary 
maintenance, assuring software functions appropriately, and ensuring that 
EHRs do not compromise patient safety. EHR vendors should not dismiss eCW 
as an isolated incident, but heed the warnings about the potential for FCA lia-
bility in the future. 
                                                        
198  Why Adopt EHRs, supra note 66. 
199  See Press Release, supra note 10. 
